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Abstract   
 
This paper aims to analyse Indonesia’s dilemmas and prospects in engaging maritime 
strategic partner between China and India while pursuing its maritime reorientation. The 
expanding presence of China in Indian Ocean and its aggressiveness in maritime territorial 
dispute in East Asia has triggered India to transform Rao’s “Look East policy” to Modi’s 
“Act East policy”.  Modi’s ambitious foreign policy increased eastward focus and his 
commitment in pursuing economic growth has been combined with India’s strategy in 
balancing against China’s Silk Road strategy. Both emerging powers, China and India, see 
Indonesia potential as strategic maritime partner in their strategic vision. Utilizing New 
Maritime Silk Road strategy or One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative in 2013, China 
engages ASEAN, including Indonesia, in infrastructure construction mega-project to enhance 
connectivity. While India, began in 1996 as dialogue partner in ASEAN Regional Partner 
(ARF), gets more involved in as ASEAN partner by joining ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in 2010 and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in 2015. 
India and Indonesia have shared the common view of culture, colonial history, and political 
sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and independent foreign policy. Theyhave been also 
originated from the same ancient polity that habituate them to cooperate even under anarchy 
situation. However, this mandala-inspired cultural legacy would also drive them toward 
potential conflict as the two countries try to structure their spatial process centripetally using 
maritime strategy. In this regards, the paper will also discuss the continuity and dissonance 
of maritime perspective in Indonesia and India experience. Jakarta’s will to strengthen its 
maritime posture marks its leitmotif to play its role as center within Southeast Asia mandala 
will be contested by India and China strategic interests in the sea.  In the cultural memory of 
region, exerting power on the sea and ownership of huge armada symbolically marks and 
legitimates a country’s supremacy within heterarchy or regional hierarchy that tends to be 
equal. Using both contemporary and classical literature, this research intends to reveal how 
the contending emerging powers seek to aspire regional leadership using maritime tradition.  
While embarking from leadership-generational change and historical experience, this paper 
will shed the light why maritime strategy acts as guiding principles for national security in 
the global geopolitical shift and regional geo-strategy.   
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Abstrak 
 
Paper ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis dilemma dan prospek Indonesia dalam berpartisipasi 
kerjasama maritim strategis antara China dan India sembari mengejar tujuan maritimnya. 
Meluasnya kehadiran China di Samudera Hindia dan perilaku agresifnya dalam sengketa 
batas maritim di Asia Timur menyebabkan adanya transformasi kebijakan “Look East 
Policy” PM Narashima Rao menjadi “Act East Policy” PM Narendra Modi. Ambisi Modi 
meningkatkan fokus kebijakan luar negeri yang mengarah ke Timur dan komitmennya 
mengejar pertumbuhan ekonomi telah digabungkan dengan strategi India dalam 
menyeimbangkan strategi Jalur Sytera milik China. Kedua kekuatan baru dunia, China dan 
India, melihat Indonesia sebagai mitra kerjasama potensial dalam visi strategis mereka. 
Memanfaatkan strategi baru jalur Sutera Maritim atau One Belt One Road (OBOR) tahun 
2013, China mengajak ASEAN, termasuk Indonesia, dalam konstruksi infrastruktur mega 
proyek untuk meningkatkan konektivitas. Sementara India, sejak tahun 1996 telah menjadi 
mitra dialog dalam ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) dan semakin terlibat sebagai mitra 
dengan bergabung pada ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) pada 2010 dan 
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) pada 2015. India dan Indonesia telah berbagi 
pandangan yang sama dalam hal budaya, sejarah kolonial, politik kedaulatan, kemandirian 
ekonomi, dan kemeredekaan kebijakan luar negeri. Kedua negara juga berasal dari nenek 
moyang yang memiliki tata kelola pemerintahan yang sama sehingga membuat mereka 
terbiasa bekerjasama dalam situasi anarki. Hanya saja, warisan budaya Mandala dapat pula 
mendorong mereka pada potensi konflik sebagaimana dua negara berupaya menyusun proses 
spasial secara terpusat menggunakan strategi maritim. Dalam kasus ini, paper in juga akan 
mendiskusikan kelanjutan dan disonansi atas perspektif maritim yang menjadi pengalaman 
Indonesia dan India. Jakarta juga akan menguatkan postur maritimnya sebagai leitmotif untuk 
memainkan peranannya sebagai pusat dalam Asia Tenggara dimana Mandala akan 
dikontestasikan oleh India dan China terkait kepentingan strategis mereka di laut. Paper ini 
akan memberikan pemahaman mengapa strategi maritim bertindak sebagai prinsip-prinsip 
pengarah bagi keamanan nasional dalam pergeseran geopolitik dan geostrategi regional. 
 
Kata kunci: Mandala, orientasi maritim, heterarchy, dissonansi 
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Introduction  
Indonesia’s cross-road position in 
the Indo-Pacific region has strategic 
significance for geostrategic global forces. 
In the Pacific Century, Indonesia's position 
became very strategic because it is home 
tothree Sea Line of Communications 
(SLOCs) and five of the world’s seven 
choke points (the Malacca Strait, the 
Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait, the 
Lombok Strait, the Ombai-Wetar Strait).  
Not only does this position make 
Indonesia as the busiest point for trade but 
also as the arena of the great powers 
struggles, including two growing forces, 
India and China. If India projects its 
influence into the South China Sea through 
Indochina, China does the same thing by 
expanding its power to Indian Ocean 
through Myanmar. In their strategic vision, 
Indonesia has potential as a maritime 
partner positioning Indonesia at the center 
of geostrategic interests. 
This two power projection raises 
the potential for instability in the region as 
a result of two new regional mandalas, 
twin power schemes of new 21st 
centuryinvolving China and India. Power 
projection clash occurs because India and 
China developed a centripetal policy that 
eventually gave rise to patronage under 
anarchy conditions. These two countries 
became two countries of civilization 
thanks to the culture and its contribution to 
the world civilization and both possessed 
nuclear weapons and developed its marine 
powers (Dellios, 2003b). They also share 
the common ideals to be new mandalas at 
the time, as well as they were home to 
ancient kingdoms that apply similar 
polities. 
The practice of ancient India’s 
mandala was documented in Chanakya’s 
Arthasastra (or Kautilya’s). Chanakya, was 
at that time the Chief Minister of the 
Mauryan Empire, recorded the practices of 
this polity. Interestingly, in ancient India, 
the political mandala (statal circle) is more 
to be secular rather than a sacred one. 
Arthasastra also considered as a secular 
work (Dellios, 2003). China, meanwhile, 
also practiced a form of mandala polity at 
the height of the Middle Kingdom 
(Dellios, 2003b).  
This study discusses the use of 
mandala to analise how Asian powers 
transforms regional political landscape. 
Despite global power is still currently 
under US shadow, Indonesia’s 
geographical proximity to two new 
emarging power has made it anticipate 
their maritime maneuvers. To this end, this 
paper aim to answer how Indonesia 
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responds to India and China maritime 
maneuvers. 
 
Mandala Traditional Geopolitics and 
Modern Geopolitics 
In examining the political 
landscape of Indonesia and Asia, I use the 
concept of mandala as an alternative tool 
in analyzing foreign and defence policy of 
Indonesia which is dominated by Javanese 
view (Sebastian and Lanti, 2010: 150) and 
as well as Asian regional security that still 
inherits the ancient cultural memory of 
ancient China and India. Mandala, 
meaning circle in Sanskrit, is a spiritual 
diagram that is the reification of cosmos 
(Dellios, 2003). Despite its mystical 
meaning, the mandala is also a geopolitical 
expression to describe the inter-
powerrelationships in ancient Indian and 
later Hindu-Buddhist periods of Southeast 
Asia. Mandala features also appeared in 
tributary system without administrative 
integration: as a circle of states, it is 
defined by the center, and not by its 
territory. Despite its roots in the Indian 
political discourse (Kautilya’s Raj 
Mandala) and the China’s mandala 
formation (at the apex of the Middle 
Kingdom dynasty), this concept has been 
modified to accommodate the 21st century 
geopolitical conditions. Higham (1989: 
240) defines mandala as “the politics of 
charismatic center, with its attraction of 
deference and obligation from other power 
centers through a demonstrated ability to 
win allies and overtake enemies”. 
As a matter of fact, mandala is 
created to structure the spatial process 
centripetally, towards the center. But 
unlike the rigid radial polity structures, 
concentrating power, and creating 
hierarchies, mandala is built to 
accommodate heterarchy: dispersed 
authority in satellite areas. Acharya and 
Buzan (2010: 228) interpret the mandala as 
polities without formal territorial 
sovereignty and practices symbolic and 
ritualistic authority. Chong (2010: 141) 
argues that mandala offers a radical 
potential for interpreting International 
Relations (IR) in different sense of 
Westphalian sovereignty. Other names for 
this concept are “galactic polity” 
(Tambiah), “theater state” (Geertz), and 
“solar polity” (Lieberman, 2003). 
In traditional polity like pre-
colonial Southeast Asia, the three 
properties contained in the mandala are: 
center, symmetry, and cardinal points 
(Tambiah, 2003). The first property, 
center, is the translation of cakravartin, the 
king’s entity which shines outward and 
represents the divine element. The center 
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is said to have personal and devotional 
power, not institutional. This power is not 
derived from conquest (albeit military 
force is the consequence), but from the 
leader's ability to tap into “cosmic power” 
with virtuous forces called “devaraja” 
(king of gods) in Hindu terms or 
“dharmaraja” in Buddhist terms. The 
second property, symmetry, is believed to 
be dynamic depending on the contextual 
situation and needs of mandala. The center 
should read the situation and adjust the 
strategy to keep the order and security 
within the mandala. The third property, 
cardinal points, which means the points 
that can affect how symmetry can be 
defined, maintained, and reconfigured. In 
pre-modern Southeast Asia, the two 
cardinal points are trade and security that 
play an important role in shaping and 
reconfiguring the regional political 
landscape. 
As a concept, mandala is both 
sacred and secular. In the internal circle it 
becomes a powerful spiritual center for 
domestic resilience, while on the outside it 
is powerful in managing relationships for 
external protection. The power gained by 
the center is the power of God. Thus, the 
mandala affinities of state are a network of 
loyalties. Interestingly, however, in India 
nad China practices, the concept of purely 
secular. In India, the political mandala, the 
statal circle, was secular affair of the 
territorial state as in China the Middle 
Kingdom implements a tributary system 
based on cultural superiority (Dellios, 
2003). 
Applying the concept or theory of 
non-Western International Relations such 
as mandala or mandala anarchy culture 
requires the transformation from hard 
theory to soft theory. Acharya and Buzan 
(2010) mapping resources of soft theories 
in four categories: 1) Classical Asian 
tradition or local religious, political, or 
military classical thinking such as 
Confucius, Kautilya, or Sun Tzu as 
Western International Relations Theory 
(IRT) drew inspiration from ancient 
Western thoughts of Thucydides, Hobbes, 
Machiavelli, Kant, and others. 2) Thoughts 
or approach of foreign policy of state 
leaders as the main source of formulating 
theory. Like Nehru, Mao, Aung San, 
Soekarno, Soeharto and other key foreign 
policy makers. 3) The third type has been 
done by most Asian scholars: using 
western HI theory to be questioned and 
evaluated for its relevance in analysis by 
retrieving data from local/regional 
experience. 4) This last type, could be an 
alternative breakthrough, focuses on 
assessing the events and experiences of 
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Asia through local/regional data mining, 
then formulating concepts as tool for 
general pattern of analysis in International 
Relations while placing Asia in a larger 
international system and comparing it with 
other world. 
In addition to the mandala concept 
rooted in Asian knowledge stocks, this 
paper also uses an alternative framework 
in IRT using Javanese thought framework. 
From the standpoint of Java’s ontology 
and epistemology, power has different 
dimension to power from those of Western 
point of view. According to Javanese, 
ontologically, anarchy and its derivative 
concepts such as the balance of power do 
not exist. While epistemologically, for 
Javanese thought, power is concrete, 
homogeneous and transcends the 
boundaries of morality. The West also 
believes that international anarchy is 
natural condition within international 
system, and the extent of power depends 
on the accumulation of matter and its use. 
These differences on the level of 
epistemology and ontology have logical 
consequences on the foreign policy 
characteristics of Javanese leaders. 
 
Geopolitics and Geostrategy 
If geography is understood as 
physical reality, then geopolitics contains 
human factor in geography: geographic 
distribution of resources centers and 
communications lines which assign values 
to locations according to their strategic 
importance. While geostrategy is the 
geographic direction of a state’s foreign 
policy. It relates to how a state 
concentrates its efforts through projection 
of military power and directs its diplomatic 
activity (Grygiel, 2006: 22). For Grygiel, 
geopolitics is not as constant as geography, 
it reflects the changing geographic 
distribution of routes and natural and 
economic resources. Geostrategy of a 
country is not always due to geographical 
or geopolitical considerations, but can be 
ideologically motivated, interest groups, or 
merely the whim of its leaders. The 
challenge for strategists is that geostrategy 
does not necessarily reflect geopolitics 
Geopolitics is determined by two 
variables: communication lines or routes 
and resources centers. The first variable is 
determined by the interaction between 
technology and geography. 
Communications line or route has 
economic and political significance (i.e. 
for the projection of power and access to 
resource centers). While the route is 
determined by three parameters: the 
discovery and creation of new routes, the 
invention of transportation technology, and 
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changes in resource location.  In short, the 
route is not just about geography, but also 
human factors. The second variable, 
resources center, is determined by the 
mastery of natural and economic 
resources. Natural resources are geological 
wealth based onterritory such as oil, water, 
coal, tin, while economic resources are 
human creations in the form of industrial 
goods such as machinery, steel and 
manufactured goods. 
Geostrategy is defined by 
geographical focus or location where the 
state directs its power. According to 
Rogers and Simon (2010) geostrategy is 
characterized by the presence of political 
and extensive military presence and 
requires a network of alliances with great 
powers that share common interests or 
with linchpin state as lesser power located 
in perceived important location. 
Theycriticise thatgeostrategywas in the 
past built from colonialism so that 
geostrategy is nothing but a form of 
imperialism. However, not all geostrategy 
is imperialism. It can be concluded 
thatgeostrategy is none other than 
exercising hard power. Herein lies the 
difference between traditional geostrategy 
and mandala geostrategy in the matter of 
exercising power. The former relies 
heavily on hard power, while the latter is 
more on soft power. 
The Javanese Concept of Power 
To give a demarcation line between 
non-Western thought and Western thought, 
the author will distinguish the concept of 
Javanese power and its difference to the 
concept of Western power. Anderson 
(2006: 21-23) argues that there are at least 
four major differences between the 
concept of Western and Javanese power. 
First, according to Western thinkers, 
power is abstract, as does the concept of 
authority or legitimacy. Power can only be 
judged by its consequences, in the context 
of patterns of social interaction-such as 
obedience, order or expectations against 
others. As for the Javanese thinkers, power 
is concrete/real and is not a theoretical 
proposition. Power is an independent 
entity and is independent of something 
else and it exists in every aspect of the 
universe: in rocks, trees, fire, and so on. 
Second, sources of power, in 
Western thought, are heterogeneous. 
Power sources can come from wealth, 
social status, office positions, 
organizations, weapons, populations, and 
so on. Meanwhile, according to Javanese 
thought, Power is homogeneous. The 
source of power comes from Power itself, 
not dependent on anything else.   
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Third, the accumulation of power 
is infinite and varies from time to time. 
Referring to the second point, it can be 
said that the accumulation of power today 
is much greater than 100 years ago. In 
contrast to Western thought, Javanese 
thinkers assume that the number of Powers 
is constant throughout the world. The 
amount of Power cannot increase or 
decrease, they can only be concentrated or 
splitted. Thus, the collection/concentration 
of Power in one place automatically 
reduces Power elsewhere.  
Fourth, according to Western 
thought, power is ambiguous in morality. 
In Western political thought there is a 
debate about legitimate power depending 
on the moral values held. While in 
Javanese political thought, Power is 
automatically legitimate, because Power is 
the moral itself. Thus, the party that 
acquires Power by itself has legitimacy 
over its people. 
Table1 
Comparison of Power in Western and 
Javanese Thought 
Source: Self Design 
 
Power Western Javanese 
Character of 
Power 
Abstract Real 
Sources of Heterogenou Homogenou
Power s (Wealth, 
weapon, 
population, 
etc.) 
s (Power 
does not 
depend on 
anything 
else) 
Accumulatio
n of Power 
Unlimited Constant 
Legitimacy Morally-
bound 
Beyond 
moral 
values 
 
Since the source of power does not depend 
on anything other than power itself, the 
central issue of Javanese political thought 
lies not in its use, but on its concentration 
and maintenance. This has become one of 
the most important characteristics in 
understanding Javanese politics—or 
further later, specifically, international 
politics in Javanese perspective. 
One of the outstanding 
characteristics of Javanese political 
thought is to make kings as center of 
cosmic power. The king in Javanese 
culture is microcosmic exponent of the 
kingdom, which connects the cosmic 
cosmos with the macrocosmic world 
(Moertono cited by Ali, 1986: 27). 
Therefore, integrating Javanese political 
thought into the Study of International 
Relations needs inclusion of king or state 
leader as an analytical unit. 
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The Political Landscape of Asia and 
Southeast Asia: Past and Contemporary 
In examining the political 
landscape of Asia and Southeast Asia, we 
can refer to the pre-colonial period. It has 
been said in several works during colonial 
times, Southeast Asia is an integral part of 
China’s tributary system. Southeast Asia is 
the backwater receiving passively the 
dominance of great power (Peng Er and 
Teo, 2012: 2 in Manggala, 2013: 1). Kang 
(2007, in Manggala, 2013) states that 
under the order of China, Asia was a stable 
region until the arrival of the colonial in 
the 19th century. 
This China-centric view is 
supported by Jacques (2011: 465-468) who 
states that China is not a conventional 
nation-state in the Western sense, but the 
civilisational state whose highest political 
priority is caring for the unity, cohesion, 
and integrity of Chinese civilization. The 
state is regarded as the embodiment, 
protector, and defender of his civilization. 
In this context, state and community 
relationships are in patron-client 
relationships. China has also developed a 
tributary system, not a nation-state system, 
which has the principle of co-existence 
with other systems of lesser power. This 
opinion is opposed by Shu (2012, in 
Manggala 2013) stating that sharp 
competition for survival and fighting for 
dominance is the character of this region. 
Manggala (2013) also states that the area 
of international relations of Southeast Asia 
has a complex political structure that 
inspired the value of mandala. 
The contemporary political 
landscape of Asia is liquid and shows the 
absence of clear patterns and orders 
(Shambaugh and Yahuda, 2008: 341). In 
Asia’s international relations, there is no 
single integrated “regional system” that 
makes its political architecture 
multilayered. There is no agreement from 
actors (states) that became the code of 
ethics of their relationship. It is interesting 
to note that the region has no conceptual 
unity if combined, but the still it produces 
order even though has not yet able called 
as “system”. 
In this region, United States—
albeit considered to be declining in power 
and influence—stillplays a major role in 
this region accompanied by the dynamics 
of major power such as China, India and 
Japan. These major powers develop their 
own pattern of relationships that 
combinescompetition and cooperation at 
the same time.  This patternis well 
represented by the expression of Chinese 
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scholars, “one superpowers, many powers” 
(yichao, duo qiang). 
US superiority can be seen from 
the reluctance of major powers—including 
China—to challenge its hegemony. China 
deliberately and consciously avoids open 
and direct confrontation with the United 
States. China continues to set the road to 
building cooperation with its Asian 
neighbors while maintaining good 
relations with the United States. The major 
powers of Asia-China, India, Japan, 
Russia-do not even combine the power to 
offset US power for three reasons. First, 
all four require the United States and 
cannot alienate Washington. Second, they 
have distrust each other. Third, all three 
are spoiled by the existing order. 
India and China, in this context, are 
also the same: engaging in cooperative 
relationships as well as competition. The 
relationship between the two is an uneasy 
relationship. India's modality: its size, 
contribution to world civilization, and its 
independent foreign policy tradition, made 
it impossible to coalesce with China 
(Shambaugh and Yahuda, 2008: 348). As a 
subsystem, both develop different systems. 
China once established the traditional 
hierarchy of Sinic, or Sinocentric 
(commonly called tributary system) that 
shadowed Asia and is now entering its 
fourth wave in history. While India built 
an Indic system that stretches from the 4th 
to the 18th centuries and survives in 
modern South Asia consisting of 6 
countries. 
Many worry that China is building 
a new version of this ancient hierarchical 
hegemonic system through some of its 
policies. It is said that the vision of 21st 
New Maritime Silk Road or One Belt, One 
Road (OBOR) initiative introduced by 
President Xi Jinping in 2013 is a 
contemporary interpretation of this 
ambition 2017. India—and Japan—areseen 
adopting internal and external policies for 
balancing against China. Domestically 
they build up their military power, and 
along with it they strengthen military 
cooperation with US. India did not remain 
silent, responded it by Act East policy.  
PM Modi’s Act East policy envisions the 
epople to people, trade, and other relations 
of India and Asian countries, but in fact it 
marks India's larger strategic role in Asia-
Pacific due to China’s expanding presence 
in the region and its assertiveness in East 
Asia maritime territorial dispute 
(Rajendram, 2014). 
Although some Southeast Asian 
countries adopt counter-China policies 
with hedging strategies, the majority of 
ASEAN countries take the opposite 
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direction. Most ASEAN countries use 
what Goh (2008) calls as “enmeshment 
strategy” to attract not only China in the 
intraregional network of mechanisms, but 
also drags other major power in the 
regional order. ASEAN countries try not to 
get caught in major power struggle by 
building a concert of power to rebalancing 
the comprehensive distribution of power 
capabilities between these forces. This 
strategy of international relations in 
Southeast Asia seems to conform the 
mandala logic of anarchy rooted in 
regional ideas and culture and focus on 
cooperation rather than competition. 
 
Indonesian Maritime Orientation: 
Continuity and Dissonance 
The election of Joko Widodo 
(commonly recognised as Jokowi) in 2014 
as the 7th Indonesian president marks a 
major change in the Indonesian policy 
orientation. From the Phinisi Ship at Sunda 
Kelapa Harbor on July 22, 2014, Joko 
Widodo—shortly after declaration of his 
victory in the presidential election—
released his enormous ambition of making 
Indonesia as “World Maritime Axis”. In 
addition to this national political stage, 
Indoesia’s land-based orientation changes 
to the maritime were also expressed at two 
international forums, APEC CEO Summit 
in Beijing, China (10/11/2014) and the 9th 
East Asia Summit in Myanmar 
(13/11/2014). 
The change in maritime orientation 
is summarized in five pillars: 1) 
development of maritime culture, 2) 
maintenance and management of marine 
resources with a focus on food security 
through the fishery industry, 3) priority on 
infrastructure development and maritime 
connectivity by building sea tolls, deep 
seaports, logisctis, ship industry, and 
maritime industry, 4) maritime diplomacy, 
and 5) maritime defense (Antara News 
Online, 2014). Not only marking a shift in 
the direction of foreign policy, this new 
doctrine also reflects the expansion of 
Indonesia's influence from ASEAN-
centered to the Indo-Pacific region with a 
broader focus on trade, infrastructure, and 
the role of Indonesia in the global and 
regional arena (The Jakarta Post, 2017).  
To translate this Maritime Doctrine, 
Jokowi describes it in several documents: 
1) Vision-Mission, 2) RPJMN, 3) White 
Book of 2015, and 4) Presidential 
Regulation no. 16/2017 consisting of a) 
National Document of Indonesian Marine 
Policy, and b) Indonesian Ocean Policy 
Action Plan 
In 2011 when India became 
chairman, IORA added 6 priority agenda: 
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1) Maritime safety and security, 2) Trade 
and investment facilitation, 3) Fisheries 
management and sustainable of harvesting 
Maring Food Resources, 4) Disaster Risk 
Reduction, 5) Academic and S & T 
Cooperation, and 6) Tourism Promotion 
and Cultural Exchanges that marks the 
expansion of the agenda from mere trade 
into maritime and environmental security 
(Agastia and Perwita, 2010). The IORA 
agenda has much in common with the 
Indonesian agenda in Indian Ocean, 
especially maritime security and economic 
interests in the pillars of Jokowi’s 
Maritime Axis (Agastia and Perwita, 
2014) 
 
Despite its status as archipelagic country, 
Indonesia is dominantly using land-based 
view in its foreign and defense policy. 
Susanto (2015) charts the evolution of 
Indonesia's maritime strategy in three 
stages: 1) Shifting from the Indonesia 
Raya conception to the Indonesian 
Archipelago, 2) Development of the 
Archipelagic Document into Wawasan 
Nusantara (Insight of the Archipelago), 3) 
Maritime Reorientation. The first and 
second stages still reflect a land-based 
view, of whichSusanto called 
“territorialisation of maritime”. The third 
stage marks an attempt to reverse the way 
of maritime-based view or "maritimisation 
of territory”. 
It is commonly believed, Jokowi is 
considered as a pioneer of Indonesian 
maritime re-orientation. However, the third 
stage of the evolution of maritime strategy 
that coincided with the period of reform 
(after fall of Soeharto, 1998) actually 
recorded Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), 
the 4th president, already has a maritime 
vision by forming the Department of 
Marine Exploration which later changed 
into the Department of Marine and 
Fisheries (DKP) as a ministry authorized 
to manage the maritime field. After 
establishing the Department of Marine 
Exploration, President Wahid also 
established the National Maritime Council 
as a marine public policy consultative 
body headed by the president, chaired 
daily by the DKP Minister with 10 related 
ministers as members. 
Although it seems only in the 
reform era Indonesia has a maritime 
vision, in fact it is not entirely true. In 
Soekarno’s office, and not in Soeharto's, 
Indonesia was the second strongest 
maritime power in Asia. Sukarno also 
incorporated maritime aspects in his 
geopolitical considerations and conveyed 
his maritime visions of an independent 
Indonesia in his speeches though still 
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referring to the classical conception of the 
archipelago, in contrast to the 1957 
Declaration of the Djuanda (Susanto, 
2015: 18). 
At the time of preparation for 
Indonesian independence, Soekarno, the 
father of the nation as well as the first 
president of Indonesia initiated the concept 
of Indonesia Raya inherited the territorial 
lands of Majapahit and Sriwijaya. This 
idea is a way of view of the expansionist 
Nusantara character so that the 
neighboring country is concerned. But the 
situation of independence only allowed 
this notion to materialize only in the 
smaller territory of the East Indies legacy, 
which became the territory of Indonesia 
today. 
 
What is the continuity of 
Indonesia's maritime strategy is that 
despite its shifting and changing, 
Indonesia's maritime strategy in the course 
of time generally consistently defines itself 
as an archipelagic state and maintains an 
archipelagist position in the formulation of 
marine general policy (Susanto, 2015: 
37).Another continuity is that Indonesian 
maritime policy is largely enacted from a 
land-based territorial orientation. Land 
orientation becomes dominant due to a 
combination of historical factors (such as 
territorial consolidation) and geopolitical 
areas. The experience of guerilla warfare 
also creates a vision of Indonesian inward-
looking territorial mastery. This posture 
also continued in Soeharto's New Order 
period when the TNI focused more on 
internal security such as separatism and 
domestic violence and maintaining 
national stability. The projection of forces 
by sea is not Indonesia’s priority in the last 
decade 
Suharto, the second president of 
Indonesia, despite of his effort developing 
an archipelagic worldview as geopolitical 
insight, has built the power of the sea to 
secure the territory internally and not to 
build it for external influences such as 
post-modernisation China built deterrent 
effect through the forces of the sea.  New 
Order Indonesia’s claim to larger 
boundaries through the Continental Shelf 
and Exclusive Economic Zone can actually 
be a rationale to build an outward-looking 
maritime orientation. But instead of 
changing the worldview outward, 
Indonesian maritime strategy in the New 
Order era to respond to two maritime 
claims is only for economic development 
and is defensive externally. 
What constitutes dissonance or 
discontinuity in the evolution of maritime 
strategy arises from the tendency to 
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discontinue land-based “territorialisation 
of maritime” perspective. The weakness 
tendency of Orde Reformasi in the 
systematization and consolidation of 
maritime strategy which is reflected in 
their vague and scattered Post-1998 
maritime initiative is understandable for it 
is still seeking for form. However, Orde 
Reformasi Indonesia's is sporadically 
attempting towards maritimisation of 
territory. 
 
Indo-Pacific Mandala and Jokowi’s 
Maritime Strategy 
The Indonesian Maritime Doctrine 
of the Jokowi period through the 
“Maritime Axis” made Indonesia expand 
its influence from Southeast Asia to Indo-
Pacific. This maritime reorientation is a 
response to the increased ignificance of the 
geostrategic Indian Ocean Rim. Gindarsah 
(2014) notes that major power, such as 
India and China, in this region will be 
more involved in strategic competition 
than cooperation. 
Although the center of the global 
mandala is still held by the US, but the 
Indo-Pacific region also raises its own 
mandala. In the mandala circle of this 
region, at least China and India are worth 
anticipating as candidates for the new 
mandala center fighting for their vassal 
polity influence. These three major power 
mutual suspicions constitute the top five 
military power making the Indian Ocean 
the location for the greatest military 
spenders (Rumley, 2013, in Agistia and 
Perwita). 
In the framework of rebalancing 
strategies, the US released the “Pivot to 
Asia” doctrine to confirm its political 
presence in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) in 
order to strengten its political and 
economic commitment in the region 
(Clinton, 2011 in Agistia). China with its 
growing military power, increased 
aggressiveness and economic strength also 
marks its presence in the region. The Navy 
China PLA ensures their presence in the 
South China Sea around the disputed 
territories of Malaysia and the Philippines. 
China builds “string of pearls” which later 
turns into OBOR. India, meanwhile, is in 
the midst of the battle of both great powers 
above and seeks also to expand influence 
on Indian Ocean. Modi’s Act of East 
policy is an attempt to respond to this. The 
three major power positions itself as the 
central mandala and seeks to concentrate 
the cosmic forces resulting in stability. 
However, Indonesia's efforts to 
expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific 
region can also be interpreted as an 
attempt to become a regional player and a 
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mandala center in subregion. The 
application of Java model power can be 
done in a hard, soft way, or blend of both. 
The adoption of an offensive strategy, in 
the sense of the use of military offensives 
against the enemy, is a rough way. In 
Javanese political thought, hardness 
implies weakness and has a counter 
productive effect on power concentration 
efforts. Instead of increasing the power, 
the use of violence against the enemy is 
prone to be exploited by a third party to 
“absorb” the power of the party being 
attacked. Conversely, subtlety in behavior 
shows the magnitude of power. This 
subtlety is manifested in the form of 
dialogue, diplomatic pressure, and all other 
subtle ways, which stem from the 
recognition of the superiority and power of 
one country. This method is also referred 
to as absorption. According to Anderson, 
absorption is defined as the voluntary 
surrender of the neighboring state to the 
supreme power of the ruler (Anderson, 
2006: 45). One main concept that the 
author wants to convey here is absorption 
politics. As mentioned above, Javanese 
political thought emphasizes stability and 
security, which depend heavily on the 
concentration of Power. If the 
concentration of Power is complete, then 
domestic confusion can be overcome and 
threats from abroad can be absorbed into. 
In the second property, symmetry, 
Indonesia should be able to cautiously read 
the geopolitical conditions of the region 
with competing major powers of US, 
China and India. However, in the 
Indonesian marine national policy 
document, the effort to translate the 
Jokowi Maritime Poros remains unclear: 
whether the core internal focus is to 
maintain domestic resilience focusing on 
infrastructure development for logistics 
such as sea tolls, or involving in external 
protection in the Indian Ocean by joining 
in the mega-project of the China’s Silk 
Road or India’s Act East. If it is a center, 
then Indonesia should carefully read the 
situation and adjust its strategy to maintain 
order and security within the mandala. 
So far, the cardinal points that 
serves to define, maintain, and reconfigure 
symmetry in Jokowi’s office is more on 
trading and lacking in security. Yet both 
points play an important role in shaping 
and reconfiguring the regional political 
landscape. To conclude, Jokowi’s 
maritime stratgey still lack of  systematic 
and measurable policy to understand its 
maritime doctrine. 
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Conclusion 
This paper shows above that the 
regional political architecture and 
Indonesia’s response can be analised using 
the concept of mandala. Indonesia’s 
strategic cross road position in Indo-
Pacific makes it asa potential strategic 
partner for major powers such as India and 
China. The Asian political landscape, 
which in realist view, has been multi 
layered and does not have a clear and 
coherent pattern that produce regularity 
like a “system”, can actually be more 
clearly analised through the concept of 
mandala. The existing political landscape 
of the Indo-Pacific region and two 
emerging mandalas, China and India, can 
be explained by applying three mandala 
properties: center, symmetry, and cardinal 
points. Both are positioning themselves as 
centers that must adapt to US global 
influence whichmanage to continue 
maintaining their political and military 
presence through Pivot to Asia doctrine. 
The adjustment tactics of China and India 
can be seen from its Maritime Silk Road-
OBOR strategy while India through Modi's 
Act East. Both still rely on the old cardinal 
point: security and trade. 
The majority of ASEAN countries, 
including Indonesia, respond through the 
realist enmeshment strategy. This pacifist 
strategy is based on cooperative approach 
because just like Javanese values, Asian 
cultural memories assume the hard way is 
not the initial option because it will 
actually make the other party absorb the 
power of attacked party. Indonesia's 
response to the political configuration of 
the region through maritime reorientation 
can also be explained through the concept 
of mandala. The modern Indonesian 
Maritime Strategy from time to time has 
continuity in two ways. First, Indonesia is 
an archipelagic country, and maintains 
archipelagist status. Second, pre-existing 
strategies are closer to a land-based 
“territorialisation of maritime” policy. 
Jokowi’s maritime strategy in the World 
Maritime Axis doctrine which tends to 
adopt maritimization of territorial 
perspective in mandala’s lens is politics of 
absorption to respond the changing 
regional political landscape. Jokowi's 
adjustment to the changing environment is 
through the reconfiguration of three 
cardinal points: security, economy, 
identity. In sum, Jokowi's maritime 
strategy still lacks explanatory documents 
that systematically and clearly guide 
itspractices. 
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